Commit Graph

38 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
d9b4406c09 2005-09-10 jrandom
* Test the router's reachability earlier and more aggressively
    * Use the low level bandwidth limiter's rates for the router console, and
      if the router has net.i2p.router.transport.FIFOBandwidthLimiter=INFO in
      the logger config, keep track of the 1 second transfer rates as the stat
      'bw.sendBps1s' and 'bw.recvBps1s', allowing closer monitoring of burst
      behavior.
2005-09-11 03:22:51 +00:00
249ccd5e3c now that its all implemented... 2005-09-10 23:18:41 +00:00
44770b7c07 2005-09-09 jrandom
* Added preliminary support for NAT hole punching through SSU introducers
    * Honor peer test results from peers that we have an SSU session with if
      those sessions are idle for 3 minutes or more.
2005-09-10 04:30:36 +00:00
11204b8a2b 2005-08-17 jrandom
* Revise the SSU peer testing protocol so that Bob verifies Charlie's
      viability before agreeing to Alice's request.  This doesn't work with
      older SSU peer test builds, but is backwards compatible (older nodes
      won't ask newer nodes to participate in tests, and newer nodes won't
      ask older nodes to either).
2005-08-17 20:05:01 +00:00
4ce6b308b3 * 2005-08-03 0.6.0.1 released
2005-08-03  jrandom
    * Backed out an inadvertant change to the netDb store redundancy factor.
    * Verify tunnel participant caching.
    * Logging cleanup
2005-08-03 18:58:12 +00:00
a8a866b5f6 * 2005-07-27 0.6 released
2005-07-27  jrandom
    * Enabled SSU as the default top priority transport, adjusting the
      config.jsp page accordingly.
    * Add verification fields to the SSU and TCP connection negotiation (not
      compatible with previous builds)
    * Enable the backwards incompatible tunnel crypto change as documented in
      tunnel-alt.html (have each hop encrypt the received IV before using it,
      then encrypt it again before sending it on)
    * Disable the I2CP encryption, leaving in place the end to end garlic
      encryption (another backwards incompatible change)
    * Adjust the protocol versions on the TCP and SSU transports so that they
      won't talk to older routers.
    * Fix up the config stats handling again
    * Fix a rare off-by-one in the SSU fragmentation
    * Reduce some unnecessary netDb resending by inluding the peers queried
      successfully in the store redundancy count.
2005-07-27 19:03:43 +00:00
76e8631e31 included IV tagging info 2005-07-07 21:16:57 +00:00
6b5b880ab6 * replaced explicit NACKs and numACKs with ACK bitfields for high congestion links
* increased the maximum number of fragments allowed in a message from 31 to 127,
  reducing the maximum fragment size to 8KB and moving around some bits in the fragment
  info.  This is not backwards compatible.
* removed the old (hokey) congestion control description, replacing it with the TCP-esque
  algorithm implemented
note: the code for the ACK bitfields and fragment info changes have not yet been
implemented, so the old version of this document describes whats going on in the live net.
the new bitfields / fragment info should be deployed in the next day or so (hopefully :)
2005-05-01 20:08:08 +00:00
e6b343070a removed copy/paste error 2005-04-09 23:15:53 +00:00
aa542b7876 for implementation simplicity, include fragment size in the SessionConfirmed packets 2005-04-08 23:20:45 +00:00
3f7d46378b * specify exactly what gets in the DSA signatures for the connection establishment
* include a new signedOnTime so that we can prepare the packet at a different moment from
  when we encrypt & send it (also allowing us to reuse that signature on resends for the same
  establishment)
2005-04-08 14:21:26 +00:00
400feb3ba7 clarify crypto/hmac usage for simpler implementation 2005-04-05 15:28:54 +00:00
756a4e3995 added a section for congestion control describing what I hope to implement. what
/actually/ gets implemented will be documented further once its, er, implemented
2005-04-04 17:21:30 +00:00
17f044e6cd if using numACKs, use a 2 byte value (to handle higher transfer rates) 2005-03-30 00:20:07 +00:00
be9bdbfe0f * simplify the MAC construct with a single HMAC (the other setup was an oracle anyway)
* split out the encryption and MAC keys
2005-03-27 22:08:16 +00:00
5c2a57f95a minor cleanup 2005-03-26 09:22:17 +00:00
9cd8cc692e added replay prevention blurb, minor cleanup 2005-03-26 09:19:42 +00:00
0626f714c6 speling (thanks cervantes) 2005-03-26 06:23:57 +00:00
21842291e9 *cough* 2005-03-26 05:56:06 +00:00
d461c295f6 first draft of secure semireliable UDP protocol 2005-03-26 05:47:40 +00:00
8b9ee4dfd7 updated to reflect what was implemented 2005-02-17 00:48:18 +00:00
a33de09ae6 * implemented fragmentation
* added more inbound tests
* made the tunnel preprocessing header more clear and included better fragmentation support
(still left: tests for outbound tunnel processing, structures and jobs to integrate with the router,
remove that full SHA256 from each and every I2NPMessage or put a smaller one at the
transport layer, and all the rest of the tunnel pooling/building stuff)
2005-01-25 05:46:22 +00:00
998f03ba68 killed the loops and the PRNGs by having the tunnel participants themselves specify what
tunnel ID they listen on and make sure the previous peer doesn't change over time.  The
worst that a hostile peer could do is create a multiplicative work factor - they send N
messages, causing N*#hops in the loop of bandwidth usage.  This is identical to the hostile
peer simply building a pair of tunnels and sending N messages through them.
also added some discussion about the tradeoffs and variations wrt fixed size tunnel messages.
2005-01-19 23:13:10 +00:00
f3b0e0cfc7 we want to use E on the preIV, not HMAC - must be invertible (duh, thanks Connelly)
adjusted preIV size accordingly, and definitely use a delivered layerIVKey
2005-01-19 06:24:25 +00:00
cd939d3379 speling mistaces 2005-01-18 16:21:12 +00:00
29e5aeff5c include the preIV in the verification hash 2005-01-18 16:01:55 +00:00
0e5cf81fca updates with new alternative crypto, including Connelly's suggestions for the IV 2005-01-18 15:55:17 +00:00
ccb1f491c7 use the first 16 bytes of the SHA256 for the columns & verification block, rather than all 32 bytes.
(AES won't let us go smaller.  oh well)
2005-01-16 06:07:06 +00:00
6b6a9490f6 include blurb explaining tunnelIDs and replay prevention (thanks Connelly!) 2005-01-16 00:08:14 +00:00
c48875a6fb cbc, nimwit 2005-01-15 06:43:35 +00:00
75a18debcb forgot to update the processing xor 2005-01-15 03:53:13 +00:00
1a15d3bb55 filled in the tunnel building alternatives, throttling techniques, and mixing (meta)details 2005-01-15 00:06:40 +00:00
ffdcae47e3 add some whitening to the IV as it goes down the path 2005-01-14 22:43:43 +00:00
9c364a64e3 more arm waiving wrt the tunnel building 2005-01-13 00:57:36 +00:00
b34306205c lets just get some visual versioning clues 2005-01-12 19:22:40 +00:00
77f778dbf9 Updated the crypto so that peer0 is the gateway (meaning max hop length is 8, not 9).
This prevents the first peer after the gateway from looking at the encrypted data received
and seeing "hey, none of the checksum blocks match the payload, they must be the gateway".
2005-01-12 19:09:00 +00:00
8fa8d7739f work in progress, but i want it in cvs so i dont lose it again 2005-01-09 23:01:34 +00:00
77bd69c5e5 beginning of branch i2p.i2p.i2p 2004-04-08 04:41:54 +00:00