Commit Graph

5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
998f03ba68 killed the loops and the PRNGs by having the tunnel participants themselves specify what
tunnel ID they listen on and make sure the previous peer doesn't change over time.  The
worst that a hostile peer could do is create a multiplicative work factor - they send N
messages, causing N*#hops in the loop of bandwidth usage.  This is identical to the hostile
peer simply building a pair of tunnels and sending N messages through them.
also added some discussion about the tradeoffs and variations wrt fixed size tunnel messages.
2005-01-19 23:13:10 +00:00
f3b0e0cfc7 we want to use E on the preIV, not HMAC - must be invertible (duh, thanks Connelly)
adjusted preIV size accordingly, and definitely use a delivered layerIVKey
2005-01-19 06:24:25 +00:00
cd939d3379 speling mistaces 2005-01-18 16:21:12 +00:00
29e5aeff5c include the preIV in the verification hash 2005-01-18 16:01:55 +00:00
0e5cf81fca updates with new alternative crypto, including Connelly's suggestions for the IV 2005-01-18 15:55:17 +00:00