From 752e1c6a423abf52aa5867a3e5d76cb006cc3b0f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: zzz <zzz@mail.i2p>
Date: Sat, 2 Jun 2012 13:53:04 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] update

---
 www.i2p2/pages/how_networkdatabase.html | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/www.i2p2/pages/how_networkdatabase.html b/www.i2p2/pages/how_networkdatabase.html
index 011ac5bc..3f44ccba 100644
--- a/www.i2p2/pages/how_networkdatabase.html
+++ b/www.i2p2/pages/how_networkdatabase.html
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 {% block content %}
 
 <p>
-  Updated August 2011, current as of router version 0.8.9
+  Updated June 2012, current as of router version 0.9
 </p>
 
 <h2>Overview</h2>
@@ -78,7 +78,6 @@
   Current statistics are limited to:
 </p>
 <ul>
-  <li>1 hour average bandwidth (average of outbound  and inbound bandwidth)
   <li>Client and exploratory tunnel build success, reject, and timeout rates
   <li>1 hour average number of participating tunnels
 </ul>
@@ -659,7 +658,8 @@ This attack becomes more difficult as the network size grows.
   Several defenses are possible, and most of these are planned:
 </p>
 <ul>
-  <li>Switching from HTTP to HTTPS for reseeding, with SSL certificate verification
+  <li>Disallow fallback from HTTPS to HTTP for reseeding.
+    A MITM attacker could simply block HTTPS, then respond to the HTTP.
   <li>Changing the reseed task to fetch a subset of RouterInfos from
     each of several reseed sites rather than using only a single site
   <li>Creating an out-of-network reseed monitoring service that