SSU2 blog start draft and link test, WIP

i2p2www/blog/2022/09/30/SSU2-Transport.draft.rst

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+===========================================
+{% trans -%}SSU2 Transport{%- endtrans %}
+===========================================
+
+.. meta::
+   :author: zzz
+   :date: 2022-09-30
+   :category: development
+   :excerpt: {% trans %}SSU2 Transport{% endtrans %}
+
+{% trans link1="{{proposal_url("159")}}" link2="{{ site_url('docs/transport/ssu') }}" link3="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ElGamal_encryption" -%}
+The Java I2P and i2pd teams are finishing the `SSU2 <{{ link1 }}>`_ transport and we will enable it for all in the next release.
+This completes our decade-long plan to upgrade all the cryptography from the original
+Java I2P implementation dating back to 2003.
+SSU2 will replace `SSU <{{ link2 }}>`_, our last remaining use of `ElGamal <{{ link3 }}>`_ cryptography.
+{%- endtrans %}
+
+- Signature types and ECDSA signatures (0.9.12, 2014)
+- ECDSA routers (??)
+- Ed25519 signatures and leasesets (0.9.15, 2014)
+- Ed25519 routers (0.9.22, 2015)
+- Destination encryption types and X25519 leasesets (0.9.46, 2020)
+- Router encryption types and X25519 routers (0.9.49, 2021)
+
+{% trans -%}
+We have now migrated all our authenticated and encrypted protocols to Noise handshakes:
+{%- endtrans %}
+
+- `NTCP2 <{{spec_url("ntcp2")}}>`_ (0.9.36, 2018)
+- `{% trans %}Ratchet end-to-end protocol{% endtrans %} <{{spec_url("ecies")}}>`_ (0.9.46, 2020)
+- `{% trans %}ECIES tunnel build messages{% endtrans %} <{{spec_url("tunnel-creation-ecies")}}>`_ (1.5.0, 2021)
+- `SSU2 <{{proposal_url("159")}}>`_ (2.0.0, 2022)
+
+{% trans -%}
+All Noise protocols use the following standard cryptographic algorithms:
+{%- endtrans %}
+
+- `X25519 <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curve25519>`_
+- `ChaCha20/Poly1305 AEAD <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8439.html>`_
+- `SHA-256 <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-2>`_
+
+{% trans -%}
+Designing a UDP transport presents unique and complex challenges not present in TCP protocols.
+A UDP protocol must handle security issues caused by address spoofing,
+and must implement its own congestion control.
+{%- endtrans %}
+
+{% trans -%}
+We first relied heavily on our previous experience with our NTCP2, SSU, and streaming protocols.
+Then, we carefully reviewed and borrowed heavily from two recently-developed UDP protocols:
+{%- endtrans %}
+
+- QUIC (`RFC 9000 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000.html>`_, `RFC 9001 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9001.html>`_, `RFC 9002 <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9002.html>`_)
+- `Wireguard <https://www.wireguard.com/protocol/>`_
+
+