forked from I2P_Developers/i2p.i2p
2005-07-04 jrandom
* Within the tunnel, use xor(IV, msg[0:16]) as the flag to detect dups, rather than the IV by itself, preventing an attack that would let colluding internal adversaries tag a message to determine that they are in the same tunnel. Thanks dvorak for the catch! * Drop long inactive profiles on startup and shutdown * /configstats.jsp: web interface to pick what stats to log * Deliver more session tags to account for wider window sizes * Cache some intermediate values in our HMACSHA256 and BC's HMAC * Track the client send rate (stream.sendBps and client.sendBpsRaw) * UrlLauncher: adjust the browser selection order * I2PAppContext: hooks for dummy HMACSHA256 and a weak PRNG * StreamSinkClient: add support for sending an unlimited amount of data * Migrate the tests out of the default build jars 2005-06-22 Comwiz * Migrate the core tests to junit
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@ -143,7 +143,8 @@ public class FragmentHandler {
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boolean eq = DataHelper.eq(v.getData(), 0, preprocessed, offset + HopProcessor.IV_LENGTH, 4);
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if (!eq) {
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if (_log.shouldLog(Log.ERROR))
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_log.error("Corrupt tunnel message - verification fails");
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_log.error("Corrupt tunnel message - verification fails: \n" + Base64.encode(preprocessed, offset+HopProcessor.IV_LENGTH, 4)
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+ "\n" + Base64.encode(v.getData(), 0, 4));
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if (_log.shouldLog(Log.WARN))
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_log.warn("nomatching endpoint: # pad bytes: " + (paddingEnd-(HopProcessor.IV_LENGTH+4)-1) + "\n"
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+ " offset=" + offset + " length=" + length + " paddingEnd=" + paddingEnd
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