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Router: Move ElGamalAESEngine from core to router

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Client end-to-end crypto removed 13 years ago
Not used by any client, app, or plugin.
This commit is contained in:
zzz
2018-11-23 13:04:28 +00:00
parent 5c0c69c654
commit 535f2daab0
6 changed files with 72 additions and 89 deletions
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26
core/java/src/net/i2p/I2PAppContext.java
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@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import net.i2p.client.naming.NamingService;
import net.i2p.crypto.AESEngine;
import net.i2p.crypto.CryptixAESEngine;
import net.i2p.crypto.DSAEngine;
import net.i2p.crypto.ElGamalAESEngine;
import net.i2p.crypto.ElGamalEngine;
import net.i2p.crypto.HMAC256Generator;
import net.i2p.crypto.HMACGenerator;
@ -74,7 +73,6 @@ public class I2PAppContext {
protected SessionKeyManager _sessionKeyManager;
private NamingService _namingService;
private ElGamalEngine _elGamalEngine;
private ElGamalAESEngine _elGamalAESEngine;
private AESEngine _AESEngine;
private LogManager _logManager;
private HMACGenerator _hmac;
@ -94,7 +92,6 @@ public class I2PAppContext {
protected volatile boolean _sessionKeyManagerInitialized;
private volatile boolean _namingServiceInitialized;
private volatile boolean _elGamalEngineInitialized;
private volatile boolean _elGamalAESEngineInitialized;
private volatile boolean _AESEngineInitialized;
private volatile boolean _logManagerInitialized;
private volatile boolean _hmacInitialized;
@ -120,7 +117,7 @@ public class I2PAppContext {
private final ClientAppManager _appManager;
// split up big lock on this to avoid deadlocks
private final Object _lock1 = new Object(), _lock2 = new Object(), _lock3 = new Object(), _lock4 = new Object(),
_lock5 = new Object(), _lock6 = new Object(), _lock7 = new Object(), _lock8 = new Object(),
_lock5 = new Object(), _lock7 = new Object(), _lock8 = new Object(),
_lock9 = new Object(), _lock10 = new Object(), _lock11 = new Object(), _lock12 = new Object(),
_lock13 = new Object(), _lock14 = new Object(), _lock16 = new Object(),
_lock17 = new Object(), _lock18 = new Object(), _lock19 = new Object(), _lock20 = new Object();
@ -681,28 +678,7 @@ public class I2PAppContext {
_elGamalEngineInitialized = true;
}
}
/**
* Access the ElGamal/AES+SessionTag engine for this context. The algorithm
* makes use of the context's sessionKeyManager to coordinate transparent
* access to the sessionKeys and sessionTags, as well as the context's elGamal
* engine (which in turn keeps stats, etc).
*
*/
public ElGamalAESEngine elGamalAESEngine() {
if (!_elGamalAESEngineInitialized)
initializeElGamalAESEngine();
return _elGamalAESEngine;
}
private void initializeElGamalAESEngine() {
synchronized (_lock6) {
if (_elGamalAESEngine == null)
_elGamalAESEngine = new ElGamalAESEngine(this);
_elGamalAESEngineInitialized = true;
}
}
/**
* Ok, I'll admit it. there is no good reason for having a context specific
* AES engine. We dont really keep stats on it, since its just too fast to

39
core/java/src/net/i2p/client/impl/I2CPMessageProducer.java
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@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ class I2CPMessageProducer {
}
msg.setSessionId(sid);
msg.setNonce(nonce);
Payload data = createPayload(dest, payload, null, null, null, null);
Payload data = createPayload(payload);
msg.setPayload(data);
session.sendMessage(msg);
}
@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ class I2CPMessageProducer {
}
msg.setSessionId(sid);
msg.setNonce(nonce);
Payload data = createPayload(dest, payload, null, null, null, null);
Payload data = createPayload(payload);
msg.setPayload(data);
session.sendMessage(msg);
}
@ -299,41 +299,14 @@ class I2CPMessageProducer {
}
}
/**
* Should we include the I2CP end to end crypto (which is in addition to any
* garlic crypto added by the router)
*
*/
static final boolean END_TO_END_CRYPTO = false;
/**
* Create a new signed payload and send it off to the destination
*
* @param tag unused - no end-to-end crypto
* @param tags unused - no end-to-end crypto
* @param key unused - no end-to-end crypto
* @param newKey unused - no end-to-end crypto
* Create a new payload.
* No more end-to-end encryption, just set the "encrypted" data to the payload.
*/
private Payload createPayload(Destination dest, byte[] payload, SessionTag tag, SessionKey key, Set<SessionTag> tags,
SessionKey newKey) throws I2PSessionException {
if (dest == null) throw new I2PSessionException("No destination specified");
private static Payload createPayload(byte[] payload) throws I2PSessionException {
if (payload == null) throw new I2PSessionException("No payload specified");
Payload data = new Payload();
if (!END_TO_END_CRYPTO) {
data.setEncryptedData(payload);
return data;
}
// no padding at this level
// the garlic may pad, and the tunnels may pad, and the transports may pad
int size = payload.length;
byte encr[] = _context.elGamalAESEngine().encrypt(payload, dest.getPublicKey(), key, tags, tag, newKey, size);
// yes, in an intelligent component, newTags would be queued for confirmation along with key, and
// generateNewTags would only generate tags if necessary
data.setEncryptedData(encr);
//_log.debug("Encrypting the payload to public key " + dest.getPublicKey().toBase64() + "\nPayload: "
// + data.calculateHash());
data.setEncryptedData(payload);
return data;
}

43
core/java/src/net/i2p/crypto/AESEngine.java
View File

@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ public class AESEngine {
int size = Hash.HASH_LENGTH
+ 4 // sizeof(payload)
+ payload.length;
int padding = ElGamalAESEngine.getPaddingSize(size, paddedSize);
int padding = getPaddingSize(size, paddedSize);
byte data[] = new byte[size + padding];
_context.sha().calculateHash(iv, 0, 16, data, 0);
@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ public class AESEngine {
cur += 4;
System.arraycopy(payload, 0, data, cur, payload.length);
cur += payload.length;
byte paddingData[] = ElGamalAESEngine.getPadding(_context, size, paddedSize);
byte paddingData[] = getPadding(_context, size, paddedSize);
System.arraycopy(paddingData, 0, data, cur, paddingData.length);
encrypt(data, 0, data, 0, sessionKey, iv, data.length);
@ -182,7 +182,44 @@ public class AESEngine {
public void decryptBlock(byte payload[], int inIndex, SessionKey sessionKey, byte rv[], int outIndex) {
System.arraycopy(payload, inIndex, rv, outIndex, rv.length - outIndex);
}
/**
* Return random bytes for padding the data to a mod 16 size so that it is
* at least minPaddedSize
*
* Public for ElGamalAESEngine.
* Not a public API, not for external use.
*
* @since 0.9.38 moved from ElGamalAESEngine
*/
public final static byte[] getPadding(I2PAppContext context, int curSize, long minPaddedSize) {
int size = getPaddingSize(curSize, minPaddedSize);
byte rv[] = new byte[size];
context.random().nextBytes(rv);
return rv;
}
/**
* Return size for padding the data to a mod 16 size so that it is
* at least minPaddedSize
*
* Public for ElGamalAESEngine.
* Not a public API, not for external use.
*
* @since 0.9.38 moved from ElGamalAESEngine
*/
public final static int getPaddingSize(int curSize, long minPaddedSize) {
int diff = 0;
if (curSize < minPaddedSize) {
diff = (int) minPaddedSize - curSize;
}
int numPadding = diff;
if (((curSize + diff) % 16) != 0) numPadding += (16 - ((curSize + diff) % 16));
return numPadding;
}
/******
public static void main(String args[]) {
I2PAppContext ctx = new I2PAppContext();

753
core/java/src/net/i2p/crypto/ElGamalAESEngine.java
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@ -1,753 +0,0 @@
package net.i2p.crypto;
/*
* free (adj.): unencumbered; not under the control of others
* Written by jrandom in 2003 and released into the public domain
* with no warranty of any kind, either expressed or implied.
* It probably won't make your computer catch on fire, or eat
* your children, but it might. Use at your own risk.
*
*/
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.Collections;
import java.util.HashSet;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Set;
import net.i2p.I2PAppContext;
import net.i2p.data.DataFormatException;
import net.i2p.data.DataHelper;
import net.i2p.data.Hash;
import net.i2p.data.PrivateKey;
import net.i2p.data.PublicKey;
import net.i2p.data.SessionKey;
import net.i2p.data.SessionTag;
import net.i2p.util.Log;
import net.i2p.util.SimpleByteCache;
/**
* Handles the actual ElGamal+AES encryption and decryption scenarios using the
* supplied keys and data.
*
* No, this does not extend AESEngine or CryptixAESEngine.
*/
public final class ElGamalAESEngine {
private final Log _log;
private final static int MIN_ENCRYPTED_SIZE = 80; // smallest possible resulting size
private final I2PAppContext _context;
/** enforced since release 0.6 */
public static final int MAX_TAGS_RECEIVED = 200;
public ElGamalAESEngine(I2PAppContext ctx) {
_context = ctx;
_log = _context.logManager().getLog(ElGamalAESEngine.class);
_context.statManager().createFrequencyStat("crypto.elGamalAES.encryptNewSession",
"how frequently we encrypt to a new ElGamal/AES+SessionTag session?",
"Encryption", new long[] { 60*60*1000l});
_context.statManager().createFrequencyStat("crypto.elGamalAES.encryptExistingSession",
"how frequently we encrypt to an existing ElGamal/AES+SessionTag session?",
"Encryption", new long[] { 60*60*1000l});
_context.statManager().createFrequencyStat("crypto.elGamalAES.decryptNewSession",
"how frequently we decrypt with a new ElGamal/AES+SessionTag session?",
"Encryption", new long[] { 60*60*1000l});
_context.statManager().createFrequencyStat("crypto.elGamalAES.decryptExistingSession",
"how frequently we decrypt with an existing ElGamal/AES+SessionTag session?",
"Encryption", new long[] { 60*60*1000l});
_context.statManager().createFrequencyStat("crypto.elGamalAES.decryptFailed",
"how frequently we fail to decrypt with ElGamal/AES+SessionTag?",
"Encryption", new long[] { 60*60*1000l});
}
/**
* Decrypt the message using the given private key using tags from the default key manager,
* which is the router's key manager. Use extreme care if you aren't the router.
*
* @deprecated specify the key manager!
*/
public byte[] decrypt(byte data[], PrivateKey targetPrivateKey) throws DataFormatException {
return decrypt(data, targetPrivateKey, _context.sessionKeyManager());
}
/**
* Decrypt the message using the given private key
* and using tags from the specified key manager.
* This works according to the
* ElGamal+AES algorithm in the data structure spec.
*
* Warning - use the correct SessionKeyManager. Clients should instantiate their own.
* Clients using I2PAppContext.sessionKeyManager() may be correlated with the router,
* unless you are careful to use different keys.
*
* @return decrypted data or null on failure
*/
public byte[] decrypt(byte data[], PrivateKey targetPrivateKey, SessionKeyManager keyManager) throws DataFormatException {
if (data == null) {
if (_log.shouldLog(Log.ERROR)) _log.error("Null data being decrypted?");
return null;
} else if (data.length < MIN_ENCRYPTED_SIZE) {
if (_log.shouldLog(Log.ERROR))
_log.error("Data is less than the minimum size (" + data.length + " < " + MIN_ENCRYPTED_SIZE + ")");
return null;
}
byte tag[] = new byte[32];
System.arraycopy(data, 0, tag, 0, 32);
SessionTag st = new SessionTag(tag);
SessionKey key = keyManager.consumeTag(st);
SessionKey foundKey = new SessionKey();
SessionKey usedKey = new SessionKey();
Set<SessionTag> foundTags = new HashSet<SessionTag>();
byte decrypted[];
boolean wasExisting = false;
final boolean shouldDebug = _log.shouldDebug();
if (key != null) {
//if (_log.shouldLog(Log.DEBUG)) _log.debug("Key is known for tag " + st);
if (shouldDebug)
_log.debug("Decrypting existing session encrypted with tag: " + st.toString() + ": key: " + key.toBase64() + ": " + data.length + " bytes " /* + Base64.encode(data, 0, 64) */ );
decrypted = decryptExistingSession(data, key, targetPrivateKey, foundTags, usedKey, foundKey);
if (decrypted != null) {
_context.statManager().updateFrequency("crypto.elGamalAES.decryptExistingSession");
if (!foundTags.isEmpty() && shouldDebug)
_log.debug("ElG/AES decrypt success with " + st + ": found tags: " + foundTags);
wasExisting = true;
} else {
_context.statManager().updateFrequency("crypto.elGamalAES.decryptFailed");
if (_log.shouldLog(Log.WARN)) {
_log.warn("ElG decrypt fail: known tag [" + st + "], failed decrypt");
}
}
} else {
if (shouldDebug) _log.debug("Key is NOT known for tag " + st);
decrypted = decryptNewSession(data, targetPrivateKey, foundTags, usedKey, foundKey);
if (decrypted != null) {
_context.statManager().updateFrequency("crypto.elGamalAES.decryptNewSession");
if (!foundTags.isEmpty() && shouldDebug)
_log.debug("ElG decrypt success: found tags: " + foundTags);
} else {
_context.statManager().updateFrequency("crypto.elGamalAES.decryptFailed");
if (_log.shouldLog(Log.WARN))
_log.warn("ElG decrypt fail: unknown tag: " + st);
}
}
//if ((key == null) && (decrypted == null)) {
//_log.debug("Unable to decrypt the data starting with tag [" + st + "] - did the tag expire recently?", new Exception("Decrypt failure"));
//}
if (!foundTags.isEmpty()) {
if (foundKey.getData() != null) {
if (shouldDebug)
_log.debug("Found key: " + foundKey.toBase64() + " tags: " + foundTags + " wasExisting? " + wasExisting);
keyManager.tagsReceived(foundKey, foundTags);
} else if (usedKey.getData() != null) {
if (shouldDebug)
_log.debug("Used key: " + usedKey.toBase64() + " tags: " + foundTags + " wasExisting? " + wasExisting);
keyManager.tagsReceived(usedKey, foundTags);
}
}
return decrypted;
}
/**
* scenario 1:
* Begin with 222 bytes, ElG encrypted, containing:
* <pre>
* - 32 byte SessionKey
* - 32 byte pre-IV for the AES
* - 158 bytes of random padding
* </pre>
* After encryption, the ElG section is 514 bytes long.
* Then encrypt with AES using that session key and the first 16 bytes of the SHA256 of the pre-IV, using
* the decryptAESBlock method & structure.
*
* @param foundTags set which is filled with any sessionTags found during decryption
* @param foundKey out parameter. Data must be unset when called; may be filled with a new sessionKey found during decryption
* @param usedKey out parameter. Data must be unset when called; usedKey.setData() will be called by this method on success.
*
* @return null if decryption fails
*/
private byte[] decryptNewSession(byte data[], PrivateKey targetPrivateKey, Set<SessionTag> foundTags, SessionKey usedKey,
SessionKey foundKey) throws DataFormatException {
if (data == null) {
//if (_log.shouldLog(Log.WARN)) _log.warn("Data is null, unable to decrypt new session");
return null;
} else if (data.length < 514) {
//if (_log.shouldLog(Log.WARN)) _log.warn("Data length is too small (" + data.length + ")");
return null;
}
byte elgEncr[] = new byte[514];
if (data.length > 514) {
System.arraycopy(data, 0, elgEncr, 0, 514);
} else {
System.arraycopy(data, 0, elgEncr, 514 - data.length, data.length);
}
byte elgDecr[] = _context.elGamalEngine().decrypt(elgEncr, targetPrivateKey);
if (elgDecr == null) {
//if (_log.shouldLog(Log.WARN))
// _log.warn("decrypt returned null", new Exception("decrypt failed"));
return null;
}
int offset = 0;
byte key[] = new byte[SessionKey.KEYSIZE_BYTES];
System.arraycopy(elgDecr, offset, key, 0, SessionKey.KEYSIZE_BYTES);
offset += SessionKey.KEYSIZE_BYTES;
usedKey.setData(key);
byte[] preIV = SimpleByteCache.acquire(32);
System.arraycopy(elgDecr, offset, preIV, 0, 32);
offset += 32;
//_log.debug("Pre IV for decryptNewSession: " + DataHelper.toString(preIV, 32));
//_log.debug("SessionKey for decryptNewSession: " + DataHelper.toString(key.getData(), 32));
// use alternate calculateHash() method to avoid object churn and caching
//Hash ivHash = _context.sha().calculateHash(preIV);
//byte iv[] = new byte[16];
//System.arraycopy(ivHash.getData(), 0, iv, 0, 16);
byte[] iv = halfHash(preIV);
SimpleByteCache.release(preIV);
// feed the extra bytes into the PRNG
_context.random().harvester().feedEntropy("ElG/AES", elgDecr, offset, elgDecr.length - offset);
byte aesDecr[] = decryptAESBlock(data, 514, data.length-514, usedKey, iv, null, foundTags, foundKey);
SimpleByteCache.release(iv);
//if (_log.shouldLog(Log.DEBUG))
// _log.debug("Decrypt with a NEW session successfull: # tags read = " + foundTags.size(),
// new Exception("Decrypted by"));
return aesDecr;
}
/**
* scenario 2:
* The data begins with 32 byte session tag, which also serves as the preIV.
* Then decrypt with AES using that session key and the first 16 bytes of the SHA256 of the pre-IV:
* <pre>
* - 2 byte integer specifying the # of session tags
* - that many 32 byte session tags
* - 4 byte integer specifying data.length
* - SHA256 of data
* - 1 byte flag that, if == 1, is followed by a new SessionKey
* - data
* - random bytes, padding the total size to greater than paddedSize with a mod 16 = 0
* </pre>
*
* If anything doesn't match up in decryption, it falls back to decryptNewSession
*
* @param foundTags set which is filled with any sessionTags found during decryption
* @param foundKey out parameter. Data must be unset when called; may be filled with a new sessionKey found during decryption
* @param usedKey out parameter. Data must be unset when called; usedKey.setData() will be called by this method on success.
*
* @return decrypted data or null on failure
*
*/
private byte[] decryptExistingSession(byte data[], SessionKey key, PrivateKey targetPrivateKey, Set<SessionTag> foundTags,
SessionKey usedKey, SessionKey foundKey) throws DataFormatException {
byte preIV[] = SimpleByteCache.acquire(32);
System.arraycopy(data, 0, preIV, 0, 32);
// use alternate calculateHash() method to avoid object churn and caching
//Hash ivHash = _context.sha().calculateHash(preIV);
//byte iv[] = new byte[16];
//System.arraycopy(ivHash.getData(), 0, iv, 0, 16);
byte[] iv = halfHash(preIV);
SimpleByteCache.release(preIV);
//_log.debug("Pre IV for decryptExistingSession: " + DataHelper.toString(preIV, 32));
//_log.debug("SessionKey for decryptNewSession: " + DataHelper.toString(key.getData(), 32));
byte decrypted[] = decryptAESBlock(data, 32, data.length-32, key, iv, preIV, foundTags, foundKey);
SimpleByteCache.release(iv);
if (decrypted == null) {
// it begins with a valid session tag, but thats just a coincidence.
//if (_log.shouldLog(Log.DEBUG))
// _log.debug("Decrypt with a non session tag, but tags read: " + foundTags.size());
if (_log.shouldLog(Log.WARN))
_log.warn("Decrypting looks negative... existing key fails with existing tag, lets try as a new one");
byte rv[] = decryptNewSession(data, targetPrivateKey, foundTags, usedKey, foundKey);
if (_log.shouldLog(Log.WARN)) {
if (rv == null)
_log.warn("Decrypting failed with a known existing tag as either an existing message or a new session");
else
_log.warn("Decrypting suceeded as a new session, even though it used an existing tag!");
}
return rv;
}
// existing session decrypted successfully!
//if (_log.shouldLog(Log.DEBUG))
// _log.debug("Decrypt with an EXISTING session tag successfull, # tags read: " + foundTags.size(),
// new Exception("Decrypted by"));
usedKey.setData(key.getData());
return decrypted;
}
/**
* Decrypt the AES data with the session key and IV. The result should be:
* <pre>
* - 2 byte integer specifying the # of session tags
* - that many 32 byte session tags
* - 4 byte integer specifying data.length
* - SHA256 of data
* - 1 byte flag that, if == 1, is followed by a new SessionKey
* - data
* - random bytes, padding the total size to greater than paddedSize with a mod 16 = 0
* </pre>
*
* If anything doesn't match up in decryption, return null. Otherwise, return
* the decrypted data and update the session as necessary. If the sentTag is not null,
* consume it, but if it is null, record the keys, etc as part of a new session.
*
* @param foundTags set which is filled with any sessionTags found during decryption
* @param foundKey out parameter. Data must be unset when called; may be filled with a new sessionKey found during decryption
* @return decrypted data or null on failure
*/
/****
private byte[] decryptAESBlock(byte encrypted[], SessionKey key, byte iv[],
byte sentTag[], Set foundTags, SessionKey foundKey) throws DataFormatException {
return decryptAESBlock(encrypted, 0, encrypted.length, key, iv, sentTag, foundTags, foundKey);
}
****/
/*
* Note: package private for ElGamalTest.testAES()
*/
byte[] decryptAESBlock(byte encrypted[], int offset, int encryptedLen, SessionKey key, byte iv[],
byte sentTag[], Set<SessionTag> foundTags, SessionKey foundKey) throws DataFormatException {
//_log.debug("iv for decryption: " + DataHelper.toString(iv, 16));
//_log.debug("decrypting AES block. encr.length = " + (encrypted == null? -1 : encrypted.length) + " sentTag: " + DataHelper.toString(sentTag, 32));
byte decrypted[] = new byte[encryptedLen];
_context.aes().decrypt(encrypted, offset, decrypted, 0, key, iv, encryptedLen);
//Hash h = _context.sha().calculateHash(decrypted);
//_log.debug("Hash of entire aes block after decryption: \n" + DataHelper.toString(h.getData(), 32));
try {
SessionKey newKey = null;
List<SessionTag> tags = null;
//ByteArrayInputStream bais = new ByteArrayInputStream(decrypted);
int cur = 0;
long numTags = DataHelper.fromLong(decrypted, cur, 2);
if ((numTags < 0) || (numTags > MAX_TAGS_RECEIVED)) throw new IllegalArgumentException("Invalid number of session tags");
if (numTags > 0) tags = new ArrayList<SessionTag>((int)numTags);
cur += 2;
//_log.debug("# tags: " + numTags);
if (numTags * SessionTag.BYTE_LENGTH > decrypted.length - 2) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("# tags: " + numTags + " is too many for " + (decrypted.length - 2));
}
for (int i = 0; i < numTags; i++) {
byte tag[] = new byte[SessionTag.BYTE_LENGTH];
System.arraycopy(decrypted, cur, tag, 0, SessionTag.BYTE_LENGTH);
cur += SessionTag.BYTE_LENGTH;
tags.add(new SessionTag(tag));
}
long len = DataHelper.fromLong(decrypted, cur, 4);
cur += 4;
//_log.debug("len: " + len);
if ((len < 0) || (len > decrypted.length - cur - Hash.HASH_LENGTH - 1))
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Invalid size of payload (" + len + ", remaining " + (decrypted.length-cur) +")");
//byte hashval[] = new byte[Hash.HASH_LENGTH];
//System.arraycopy(decrypted, cur, hashval, 0, Hash.HASH_LENGTH);
//readHash = new Hash();
//readHash.setData(hashval);
//readHash = Hash.create(decrypted, cur);
int hashIndex = cur;
cur += Hash.HASH_LENGTH;
byte flag = decrypted[cur++];
if (flag == 0x01) {
byte rekeyVal[] = new byte[SessionKey.KEYSIZE_BYTES];
System.arraycopy(decrypted, cur, rekeyVal, 0, SessionKey.KEYSIZE_BYTES);
cur += SessionKey.KEYSIZE_BYTES;
newKey = new SessionKey();
newKey.setData(rekeyVal);
}
byte unencrData[] = new byte[(int) len];
System.arraycopy(decrypted, cur, unencrData, 0, (int)len);
cur += (int) len;
// use alternate calculateHash() method to avoid object churn and caching
//Hash calcHash = _context.sha().calculateHash(unencrData);
//boolean eq = calcHash.equals(readHash);
byte[] calcHash = SimpleByteCache.acquire(32);
_context.sha().calculateHash(unencrData, 0, (int) len, calcHash, 0);
boolean eq = DataHelper.eq(decrypted, hashIndex, calcHash, 0, 32);
SimpleByteCache.release(calcHash);
if (eq) {
// everything matches. w00t.
if (tags != null)
foundTags.addAll(tags);
if (newKey != null) foundKey.setData(newKey.getData());
return unencrData;
}
throw new RuntimeException("Hash does not match");
} catch (RuntimeException e) {
if (_log.shouldLog(Log.WARN)) _log.warn("Unable to decrypt AES block", e);
return null;
}
}
/**
* Encrypt the unencrypted data to the target. The total size returned will be
* no less than the paddedSize parameter, but may be more. This method uses the
* ElGamal+AES algorithm in the data structure spec.
*
* @param target public key to which the data should be encrypted.
* @param key session key to use during encryption
* @param tagsForDelivery session tags to be associated with the key (or newKey if specified), or null;
* 200 max enforced at receiver
* @param currentTag sessionTag to use, or null if it should use ElG (i.e. new session)
* @param newKey key to be delivered to the target, with which the tagsForDelivery should be associated, or null
* @param paddedSize minimum size in bytes of the body after padding it (if less than the
* body's real size, no bytes are appended but the body is not truncated)
*
* Unused externally, only called by below (i.e. newKey is always null)
*/
public byte[] encrypt(byte data[], PublicKey target, SessionKey key, Set<SessionTag> tagsForDelivery,
SessionTag currentTag, SessionKey newKey, long paddedSize) {
if (currentTag == null) {
if (_log.shouldLog(Log.INFO))
_log.info("Current tag is null, encrypting as new session");
_context.statManager().updateFrequency("crypto.elGamalAES.encryptNewSession");
return encryptNewSession(data, target, key, tagsForDelivery, newKey, paddedSize);
}
//if (_log.shouldLog(Log.INFO))
// _log.info("Current tag is NOT null, encrypting as existing session");
_context.statManager().updateFrequency("crypto.elGamalAES.encryptExistingSession");
byte rv[] = encryptExistingSession(data, target, key, tagsForDelivery, currentTag, newKey, paddedSize);
if (_log.shouldLog(Log.DEBUG))
_log.debug("Existing session encrypted with tag: " + currentTag.toString() + ": " + rv.length + " bytes and key: " + key.toBase64() /* + ": " + Base64.encode(rv, 0, 64) */);
return rv;
}
/**
* Encrypt the data to the target using the given key and deliver the specified tags
* No new session key
* This is the one called from GarlicMessageBuilder and is the primary entry point.
*
* Re: padded size: The AES block adds at least 39 bytes of overhead to the data, and
* that is included in the minimum size calculation.
*
* In the router, we always use garlic messages. A garlic message with a single
* clove and zero data is about 84 bytes, so that's 123 bytes minimum. So any paddingSize
* &lt;= 128 is a no-op as every message will be at least 128 bytes
* (Streaming, if used, adds more overhead).
*
* Outside the router, with a client using its own message format, the minimum size
* is 48, so any paddingSize &lt;= 48 is a no-op.
*
* Not included in the minimum is a 32-byte session tag for an existing session,
* or a 514-byte ElGamal block and several 32-byte session tags for a new session.
* So the returned encrypted data will be at least 32 bytes larger than paddedSize.
*
* @param target public key to which the data should be encrypted.
* @param key session key to use during encryption
* @param tagsForDelivery session tags to be associated with the key or null;
* 200 max enforced at receiver
* @param currentTag sessionTag to use, or null if it should use ElG (i.e. new session)
* @param paddedSize minimum size in bytes of the body after padding it (if less than the
* body's real size, no bytes are appended but the body is not truncated)
*
*/
public byte[] encrypt(byte data[], PublicKey target, SessionKey key, Set<SessionTag> tagsForDelivery,
SessionTag currentTag, long paddedSize) {
return encrypt(data, target, key, tagsForDelivery, currentTag, null, paddedSize);
}
/**
* Encrypt the data to the target using the given key and deliver the specified tags
* No new session key
* No current tag (encrypt as new session)
*
* @param tagsForDelivery session tags to be associated with the key or null;
* 200 max enforced at receiver
* @deprecated unused
*/
public byte[] encrypt(byte data[], PublicKey target, SessionKey key, Set<SessionTag> tagsForDelivery, long paddedSize) {
return encrypt(data, target, key, tagsForDelivery, null, null, paddedSize);
}
/**
* Encrypt the data to the target using the given key delivering no tags
* No new session key
* No current tag (encrypt as new session)
*
* @deprecated unused
*/
public byte[] encrypt(byte data[], PublicKey target, SessionKey key, long paddedSize) {
return encrypt(data, target, key, null, null, null, paddedSize);
}
/**
* scenario 1:
* Begin with 222 bytes, ElG encrypted, containing:
* <pre>
* - 32 byte SessionKey
* - 32 byte pre-IV for the AES
* - 158 bytes of random padding
* </pre>
* After encryption, the ElG section is 514 bytes long.
* Then encrypt the following with AES using that session key and the first 16 bytes of the SHA256 of the pre-IV:
* <pre>
* - 2 byte integer specifying the # of session tags
* - that many 32 byte session tags
* - 4 byte integer specifying data.length
* - SHA256 of data
* - 1 byte flag that, if == 1, is followed by a new SessionKey
* - data
* - random bytes, padding the total size to greater than paddedSize with a mod 16 = 0
* </pre>
*
* @param tagsForDelivery session tags to be associated with the key or null;
* 200 max enforced at receiver
*/
private byte[] encryptNewSession(byte data[], PublicKey target, SessionKey key, Set<SessionTag> tagsForDelivery,
SessionKey newKey, long paddedSize) {
//_log.debug("Encrypting to a NEW session");
byte elgSrcData[] = new byte[SessionKey.KEYSIZE_BYTES+32+158];
System.arraycopy(key.getData(), 0, elgSrcData, 0, SessionKey.KEYSIZE_BYTES);
// get both the preIV and the padding at once, then copy to the preIV array
_context.random().nextBytes(elgSrcData, SessionKey.KEYSIZE_BYTES, 32 + 158);
byte preIV[] = SimpleByteCache.acquire(32);
System.arraycopy(elgSrcData, SessionKey.KEYSIZE_BYTES, preIV, 0, 32);
//_log.debug("Pre IV for encryptNewSession: " + DataHelper.toString(preIV, 32));
//_log.debug("SessionKey for encryptNewSession: " + DataHelper.toString(key.getData(), 32));
long before = _context.clock().now();
byte elgEncr[] = _context.elGamalEngine().encrypt(elgSrcData, target);
if (_log.shouldLog(Log.INFO)) {
long after = _context.clock().now();
_log.info("elgEngine.encrypt of the session key took " + (after - before) + "ms");
}
if (elgEncr.length < 514) {
// ??? ElGamalEngine.encrypt() always returns 514 bytes
byte elg[] = new byte[514];
int diff = elg.length - elgEncr.length;
//if (_log.shouldLog(Log.DEBUG)) _log.debug("Difference in size: " + diff);
System.arraycopy(elgEncr, 0, elg, diff, elgEncr.length);
elgEncr = elg;
}
//_log.debug("ElGamal encrypted length: " + elgEncr.length + " elGamal source length: " + elgSrc.toByteArray().length);
// should we also feed the encrypted elG block into the harvester?
// use alternate calculateHash() method to avoid object churn and caching
//Hash ivHash = _context.sha().calculateHash(preIV);
//byte iv[] = new byte[16];
//System.arraycopy(ivHash.getData(), 0, iv, 0, 16);
byte[] iv = halfHash(preIV);
SimpleByteCache.release(preIV);
byte aesEncr[] = encryptAESBlock(data, key, iv, tagsForDelivery, newKey, paddedSize);
SimpleByteCache.release(iv);
//_log.debug("AES encrypted length: " + aesEncr.length);
byte rv[] = new byte[elgEncr.length + aesEncr.length];
System.arraycopy(elgEncr, 0, rv, 0, elgEncr.length);
System.arraycopy(aesEncr, 0, rv, elgEncr.length, aesEncr.length);
//_log.debug("Return length: " + rv.length);
//long finish = _context.clock().now();
//if (_log.shouldLog(Log.DEBUG))
// _log.debug("after the elgEngine.encrypt took a total of " + (finish - after) + "ms");
return rv;
}
/**
* scenario 2:
* Begin with 32 byte session tag, which also serves as the preIV.
* Then encrypt with AES using that session key and the first 16 bytes of the SHA256 of the pre-IV:
* <pre>
* - 2 byte integer specifying the # of session tags
* - that many 32 byte session tags
* - 4 byte integer specifying data.length
* - SHA256 of data
* - 1 byte flag that, if == 1, is followed by a new SessionKey
* - data
* - random bytes, padding the total size to greater than paddedSize with a mod 16 = 0
* </pre>
*
* @param target unused, this is AES encrypt only using the session key and tag
* @param tagsForDelivery session tags to be associated with the key or null;
* 200 max enforced at receiver
*/
private byte[] encryptExistingSession(byte data[], PublicKey target, SessionKey key, Set<SessionTag> tagsForDelivery,
SessionTag currentTag, SessionKey newKey, long paddedSize) {
//_log.debug("Encrypting to an EXISTING session");
byte rawTag[] = currentTag.getData();
//_log.debug("Pre IV for encryptExistingSession (aka tag): " + currentTag.toString());
//_log.debug("SessionKey for encryptNewSession: " + DataHelper.toString(key.getData(), 32));
// use alternate calculateHash() method to avoid object churn and caching
//Hash ivHash = _context.sha().calculateHash(rawTag);
//byte iv[] = new byte[16];
//System.arraycopy(ivHash.getData(), 0, iv, 0, 16);
byte[] iv = halfHash(rawTag);
byte aesEncr[] = encryptAESBlock(data, key, iv, tagsForDelivery, newKey, paddedSize, SessionTag.BYTE_LENGTH);
SimpleByteCache.release(iv);
// that prepended SessionTag.BYTE_LENGTH bytes at the beginning of the buffer
System.arraycopy(rawTag, 0, aesEncr, 0, rawTag.length);
return aesEncr;
}
/**
* Generate the first 16 bytes of the SHA-256 hash of the data.
*
* Here we are careful to use the SHA256Generator method that does not
* generate a Hash object or cache the result.
*
* @param preIV the 32 byte pre-IV. Caller should call SimpleByteCache.release(data) after use.
* @return a 16 byte array. Caller should call SimpleByteCache.release(rv) after use.
* @since 0.8.9
*/
private byte[] halfHash(byte[] preIV) {
byte[] ivHash = SimpleByteCache.acquire(32);
_context.sha().calculateHash(preIV, 0, 32, ivHash, 0);
byte iv[] = SimpleByteCache.acquire(16);
System.arraycopy(ivHash, 0, iv, 0, 16);
SimpleByteCache.release(ivHash);
return iv;
}
/**
* For both scenarios, this method encrypts the AES area using the given key, iv
* and making sure the resulting data is at least as long as the paddedSize and
* also mod 16 bytes. The contents of the encrypted data is:
* <pre>
* - 2 byte integer specifying the # of session tags
* - that many 32 byte session tags
* - 4 byte integer specifying data.length
* - SHA256 of data
* - 1 byte flag that, if == 1, is followed by a new SessionKey
* - data
* - random bytes, padding the total size to greater than paddedSize with a mod 16 = 0
* </pre>
*
* Note: package private for ElGamalTest.testAES()
*
* @param tagsForDelivery session tags to be associated with the key or null;
* 200 max enforced at receiver
*/
final byte[] encryptAESBlock(byte data[], SessionKey key, byte[] iv, Set<SessionTag> tagsForDelivery, SessionKey newKey,
long paddedSize) {
return encryptAESBlock(data, key, iv, tagsForDelivery, newKey, paddedSize, 0);
}
/**
*
* @param tagsForDelivery session tags to be associated with the key or null;
* 200 max enforced at receiver
*/
private final byte[] encryptAESBlock(byte data[], SessionKey key, byte[] iv, Set<SessionTag> tagsForDelivery, SessionKey newKey,
long paddedSize, int prefixBytes) {
//_log.debug("iv for encryption: " + DataHelper.toString(iv, 16));
//_log.debug("Encrypting AES");
if (tagsForDelivery == null) tagsForDelivery = Collections.emptySet();
int size = 2 // sizeof(tags)
+ SessionTag.BYTE_LENGTH*tagsForDelivery.size()
+ 4 // payload length
+ Hash.HASH_LENGTH
+ (newKey == null ? 1 : 1 + SessionKey.KEYSIZE_BYTES)
+ data.length;
int totalSize = size + getPaddingSize(size, paddedSize);
byte aesData[] = new byte[totalSize + prefixBytes];
int cur = prefixBytes;
DataHelper.toLong(aesData, cur, 2, tagsForDelivery.size());
cur += 2;
for (SessionTag tag : tagsForDelivery) {
System.arraycopy(tag.getData(), 0, aesData, cur, SessionTag.BYTE_LENGTH);
cur += SessionTag.BYTE_LENGTH;
}
//_log.debug("# tags created, registered, and written: " + tagsForDelivery.size());
DataHelper.toLong(aesData, cur, 4, data.length);
cur += 4;
//_log.debug("data length: " + data.length);
// use alternate calculateHash() method to avoid object churn and caching
//Hash hash = _context.sha().calculateHash(data);
//System.arraycopy(hash.getData(), 0, aesData, cur, Hash.HASH_LENGTH);
_context.sha().calculateHash(data, 0, data.length, aesData, cur);
cur += Hash.HASH_LENGTH;
//_log.debug("hash of data: " + DataHelper.toString(hash.getData(), 32));
if (newKey == null) {
aesData[cur++] = 0x00; // don't rekey
//_log.debug("flag written");
} else {
aesData[cur++] = 0x01; // rekey
System.arraycopy(newKey.getData(), 0, aesData, cur, SessionKey.KEYSIZE_BYTES);
cur += SessionKey.KEYSIZE_BYTES;
}
System.arraycopy(data, 0, aesData, cur, data.length);
cur += data.length;
//_log.debug("raw data written: " + len);
byte padding[] = getPadding(_context, size, paddedSize);
//_log.debug("padding length: " + padding.length);
System.arraycopy(padding, 0, aesData, cur, padding.length);
cur += padding.length;
//Hash h = _context.sha().calculateHash(data);
//_log.debug("Hash of entire aes block before encryption: (len=" + data.length + ")\n" + DataHelper.toString(h.getData(), 32));
_context.aes().encrypt(aesData, prefixBytes, aesData, prefixBytes, key, iv, aesData.length - prefixBytes);
//_log.debug("Encrypted length: " + aesEncr.length);
//return aesEncr;
return aesData;
}
/**
* Return random bytes for padding the data to a mod 16 size so that it is
* at least minPaddedSize
*
*/
final static byte[] getPadding(I2PAppContext context, int curSize, long minPaddedSize) {
int size = getPaddingSize(curSize, minPaddedSize);
byte rv[] = new byte[size];
context.random().nextBytes(rv);
return rv;
}
final static int getPaddingSize(int curSize, long minPaddedSize) {
int diff = 0;
if (curSize < minPaddedSize) {
diff = (int) minPaddedSize - curSize;
}
int numPadding = diff;
if (((curSize + diff) % 16) != 0) numPadding += (16 - ((curSize + diff) % 16));
return numPadding;
}
/****
public static void main(String args[]) {
I2PAppContext ctx = new I2PAppContext();
ElGamalAESEngine e = new ElGamalAESEngine(ctx);
Object kp[] = ctx.keyGenerator().generatePKIKeypair();
PublicKey pubKey = (PublicKey)kp[0];
PrivateKey privKey = (PrivateKey)kp[1];
SessionKey sessionKey = ctx.keyGenerator().generateSessionKey();
for (int i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
try {
Set tags = new HashSet(5);
if (i == 0) {
for (int j = 0; j < 5; j++)
tags.add(new SessionTag(true));
}
byte encrypted[] = e.encrypt("blah".getBytes(), pubKey, sessionKey, tags, 1024);
byte decrypted[] = e.decrypt(encrypted, privKey);
if ("blah".equals(new String(decrypted))) {
System.out.println("equal on " + i);
} else {
System.out.println("NOT equal on " + i + ": " + new String(decrypted));
break;
}
ctx.sessionKeyManager().tagsDelivered(pubKey, sessionKey, tags);
} catch (Exception ee) {
ee.printStackTrace();
break;
}
}
}
****/
}