forked from I2P_Developers/i2p.i2p
Crypto: HMAC-SHA256 cleanup
Add byte[] key method to reduce object churn in NTCP2 Un-deprecate in context
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@ -746,8 +746,9 @@ public class I2PAppContext {
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}
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}
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/** @deprecated used only by syndie */
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@Deprecated
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/**
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* Un-deprecated in 0.9.38
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*/
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public HMAC256Generator hmac256() {
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if (!_hmac256Initialized)
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initializeHMAC256();
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@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import java.security.GeneralSecurityException;
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import java.security.Key;
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import java.security.MessageDigest;
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import java.security.NoSuchAlgorithmException;
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import javax.crypto.Mac;
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import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec;
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import net.i2p.I2PAppContext;
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@ -19,7 +20,7 @@ import org.bouncycastle.oldcrypto.macs.I2PHMac;
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*
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* As of 0.9.12, uses javax.crypto.Mac.
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*
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* Deprecated, used only by Syndie.
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* Warning - used by Syndie, don't break it.
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*/
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public final class HMAC256Generator extends HMACGenerator {
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@ -33,6 +34,7 @@ public final class HMAC256Generator extends HMACGenerator {
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* @throws UnsupportedOperationException since 0.9.12
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*/
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@Override
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@Deprecated
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protected I2PHMac acquire() {
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throw new UnsupportedOperationException();
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}
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@ -46,6 +48,7 @@ public final class HMAC256Generator extends HMACGenerator {
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* @since 0.9.12 overrides HMACGenerator
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*/
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@Override
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@Deprecated
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public Hash calculate(SessionKey key, byte data[]) {
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throw new UnsupportedOperationException();
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}
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@ -60,9 +63,22 @@ public final class HMAC256Generator extends HMACGenerator {
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*/
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@Override
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public void calculate(SessionKey key, byte data[], int offset, int length, byte target[], int targetOffset) {
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calculate(key.getData(), data, offset, length, target, targetOffset);
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}
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/**
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* Calculate the HMAC of the data with the given key.
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* Outputs 32 bytes to target starting at targetOffset.
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*
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* @param key 32 bytes
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* @throws UnsupportedOperationException if the JVM does not support it
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* @throws IllegalArgumentException for bad key or target too small
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* @since 0.9.38
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*/
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public void calculate(byte[] key, byte data[], int offset, int length, byte target[], int targetOffset) {
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try {
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javax.crypto.Mac mac = javax.crypto.Mac.getInstance("HmacSHA256");
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Key keyObj = new SecretKeySpec(key.getData(), "HmacSHA256");
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Mac mac = Mac.getInstance("HmacSHA256");
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Key keyObj = new SecretKeySpec(key, "HmacSHA256");
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mac.init(keyObj);
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mac.update(data, offset, length);
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mac.doFinal(target, targetOffset);
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@ -436,34 +436,28 @@ class OutboundNTCP2State implements EstablishState {
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static byte[][] generateSipHashKeys(RouterContext ctx, HandshakeState state) {
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// TODO use noise HMAC or HKDF method instead?
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// ask_master = HKDF(ck, zerolen, info="ask")
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SessionKey tk = new SessionKey(state.getChainingKey());
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byte[] temp_key = doHMAC(ctx, tk, ZEROLEN);
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tk = new SessionKey(temp_key);
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byte[] ask_master = doHMAC(ctx, tk, ASK);
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byte[] temp_key = doHMAC(ctx, state.getChainingKey(), ZEROLEN);
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byte[] ask_master = doHMAC(ctx, temp_key, ASK);
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byte[] tmp = new byte[32 + SIPHASH.length];
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byte[] hash = state.getHandshakeHash();
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System.arraycopy(hash, 0, tmp, 0, 32);
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System.arraycopy(SIPHASH, 0, tmp, 32, SIPHASH.length);
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tk = new SessionKey(ask_master);
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temp_key = doHMAC(ctx, tk, tmp);
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tk = new SessionKey(temp_key);
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byte[] sip_master = doHMAC(ctx, tk, ONE);
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tk = new SessionKey(sip_master);
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temp_key = doHMAC(ctx, tk, ZEROLEN);
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tk = new SessionKey(temp_key);
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temp_key = doHMAC(ctx, ask_master, tmp);
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byte[] sip_master = doHMAC(ctx, temp_key, ONE);
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temp_key = doHMAC(ctx, sip_master, ZEROLEN);
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// Output 1
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byte[] sip_ab = doHMAC(ctx, tk, ONE);
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byte[] sip_ab = doHMAC(ctx, temp_key, ONE);
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// Output 2
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tmp = new byte[KEY_SIZE + 1];
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System.arraycopy(sip_ab, 0, tmp, 0, 32);
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tmp[32] = 2;
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byte[] sip_ba = doHMAC(ctx, tk, tmp);
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byte[] sip_ba = doHMAC(ctx, temp_key, tmp);
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Arrays.fill(temp_key, (byte) 0);
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Arrays.fill(tmp, (byte) 0);
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return new byte[][] { sip_ab, sip_ba };
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}
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private static byte[] doHMAC(RouterContext ctx, SessionKey key, byte data[]) {
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private static byte[] doHMAC(RouterContext ctx, byte[] key, byte[] data) {
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byte[] rv = new byte[32];
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ctx.hmac256().calculate(key, data, 0, data.length, rv, 0);
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return rv;
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